Mr. President, just return to your Villa and work out your anti-al Shabab strategy afresh

By The Editorial Board

For nearly a month, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was in Dhusamareeb, a city in Galgadud region, with the sole aim of mobilizing local communities and showing solidarity with the soldiers planning to clear the remaining pockets in central regions of al Shabab.

However, the president’s efforts have painfully ended up in utter fiasco. Hundreds of soldiers have so far either been killed or wounded or are missing in ill-conceived operations, most notably the Awsweyne battle.

The militants, boosted by the new weapons they’ve captured, are now more powerful and confident than they were a month ago – thanks to the president’s defective, anti-al Shabab strategy in Mudug and Galgaduud regions. The militants are also back in the areas they had briefly retreated from.

In any functioning nation, such a debacle would have prompted a widespread outcry, an urgent investigation and new strategies. Officials who sent the soldiers to the Awsweyne meat grinder would have been punished.

In Somalia, though, blunders of epic proportions are repeated over and over again, and that could explain why the country is still mired in chaos more than three decades since warlords toppled its last central government.

Somali officials hardly pay a price for their acts of omission or commission. Universal norms of good governance, transparency and accountability have long been shattered in the country.

The failure in Awsweyne is emblematic of the decay in Somalia’s current government that is plagued by incompetence, rampant corruption, nepotism and a lack of coordination.

Somalis have sown the wind and are now reaping the whirlwind. They corruptly selected parliamentarians who, in turn, corruptly elected a president, whose understanding of governance is to amass power in his hands, emasculate his prime minister and appoint individuals with dubious track records to key security positions.

In office for nearly a year and four months, President Hassan has already done a huge harm to his reputation, to the nation’s recovery efforts and to the army’s capability. His second term seems to echo his first term that was characterized by sleaze, nepotism and looting of government properties. (His son is a part of a cartel that earns massive profits by bringing khat into the country to poison Somalis.)

Despite the disastrous military setback in Awsweyne, President Hassan is still persisting in his ill-advised bid to kick militants out of their bases in central regions, even when he has not bothered to fix the root problems that had led to the initial failure.

For instance, the president is yet to address the broken relationship among the army chief, field commanders, the defense minister and the spy chief. A repeat of the Awsweyne humiliation is likely to happen if the president doesn’t resolve intelligence and leadership challenges in the military.

As usual, the president sees the speck in his critics’ eyes and ignores the log in his eyes.

In an address to a group of soldiers in Mahas on Tuesday, the president derided those denouncing his floundering anti-al Shabab efforts as “fools,” who “see the failure (of the army) as a success.”

That is a naive reasoning.

An overwhelming majority of Somalis hate al Shabab and would rejoice in its annihilation at the hands of the army.

Al Shabab is Somalia’s No. 1 enemy that for almost 17 years mercilessly murdered or maimed tens of thousands of men, women and children. Somalis have no reason whatsoever to support their killers.

But the president’s simplistic take should not distract us from having a candid conversation about the enemy we are fighting.

We have to ask how al Shabab fighters are able to regularly overrun the country’s well-trained soldiers. Who’s profiting from the country’s insecurity? Why have all the previous attempts to defeat al Shabab failed? Why is it hard to pacify the country?

We must also raise valid questions about what the tens of thousands of African forces and other foreign soldiers are doing in the country if they couldn’t help us eradicate the terrorists. Somalis and their leaders shouldn’t accept their country to be turned into a cash cow for Africans hired by countries with imperial mindset.

Could it be possible that these forces or countries with sinister agenda are fueling the insecurity in the country to prolong their stay or stymie our attempts to stand on our own feet once again.

The public needs to get answers for these pertinent questions and the president must not sweep his citizens’ concerns under the rug. We have to debate about the best strategies and tactics to defeat al Shabab to restore peace to our nation. We can’t keep going around in circles.

Nor can we just wake up one morning and launch a large-scale military operation against a group that in actual fact appears to be an international mercenary planted in the country to stunt our recovery and loot our resources.

The president should tell the public why he’s focusing on central regions, while neglecting Mogadishu’s insecurity or overlooking the misfits’ headquarters in Jilib and its neighboring regions, which are the country’s breadbaskets.

Is it true that – as some people have alleged – the president has hatched a plan to remove the militants from central regions so as he brings in foreign companies to explore minerals and oil and gas.

President Hassan has a lot of explaining to do before condemning Somalis for questioning the wisdom behind his new-found zeal to send the country’s best soldiers to central regions. Somalis are sick and tired of leaders who try to deflect blame from themselves when the public demands answers.

As the country’s commander in chief, the president must have known that a war needs a clear strategy that includes an explanation about why he is sending gallant soldiers to the battlefield.

The current offensive – as it’s right now in central regions — is a deathtrap for the soldiers. It was rushed, lacked effective communication strategy and contained little “capture and hold” plan or any practical stratagem to win over the hearts and minds of the people who live under the militants’ rule and believe that they’re better off under ruthless militants than under corrupt government and undisciplined soldiers.

A genuine leader would have admitted the mistakes made, halted the operation and went back to the drawing board to re-strategize. He would have returned to the capital, fired his military advisers, the spy chief, the army chief, the defense minister and recommended a full cabinet reshuffle to revitalize the anti-al Shabab efforts.

Relocating from one area to another out of desperation and without a sound war plan is not what is expected of President Hassan. He should return to his Villa and work out his anti-al Shabab strategy afresh.